0.10.1: 安全与业务逻辑加固、新品牌与部署加固

三轮审查修复(60+ 项),相对远端 main(b536672)的关键变更:
- 安全: 数据面 SSRF 拨号防护(防 DNS rebinding)/上游凭据剥离/登录防枚举
  与锁定态统一/可信代理(X-Forwarded-For)限流加固/会话版本失效机制/
  撤销即时传播/弱密钥拒绝启动/脱敏字节级重写(保签名契约)
- 业务逻辑: 裸 body 上传 panic/bootstrap 审计管线卡死/定价通配符优先级/
  全局工具可见性/调度器停机补跑/TOTP 挑战令牌消费顺序/熔断探针语义/
  >4MB 响应 token 计量/管理员重置密码作废会话 等
- 前端: 新 logo(语枢 AI 网关主题)/Provider 凭据异常警示/删除入口/
  后端错误消息透传/localStorage 敏感数据收敛
- 部署: CREDENTIAL_MASTER_KEY 持久化与弱值拒绝/Provider DELETE 接口/
  nginx 安全头/worker 内存限制
- 新增迁移 000029(key_hash 索引)/000030(usage_daily 币种维度)

internal/identity/ratelimit.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/netip"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
@@ -24,13 +25,55 @@ import (
 // If Redis is unavailable or not configured the limiter fails OPEN (login
 // proceeds, account lockout still applies) rather than locking every user out.
 type LoginLimiter struct {
-	client *redis.Client
-	max    int
-	window time.Duration
+	client  *redis.Client
+	max     int
+	window  time.Duration
+	trusted []netip.Prefix
 }
 
-func NewLoginLimiter(client *redis.Client, max int, window time.Duration) *LoginLimiter {
-	return &LoginLimiter{client: client, max: max, window: window}
+func NewLoginLimiter(client *redis.Client, max int, window time.Duration, trustedProxies []netip.Prefix) *LoginLimiter {
+	return &LoginLimiter{client: client, max: max, window: window, trusted: trustedProxies}
+}
+
+// ClientIP 提取用于登录限流的客户端 IP。仅当直连对端(RemoteAddr)属于可信
+// 代理网段时才采信 X-Forwarded-For;否则任何公网客户端都可以伪造该头,把
+// 每 IP 滑动窗口的键旋转掉,彻底绕过登录限流。
+func (l *LoginLimiter) ClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
+	if l != nil && len(l.trusted) > 0 {
+		peer, err := netip.ParseAddr(peerHost(r.RemoteAddr))
+		if err == nil {
+			peer = peer.Unmap()
+			trustedPeer := false
+			for _, prefix := range l.trusted {
+				if prefix.Contains(peer) {
+					trustedPeer = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if trustedPeer {
+				if fwd := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); fwd != "" {
+					if first := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(fwd, ",")[0]); first != "" {
+						return first
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return peerHost(r.RemoteAddr)
+}
+
+func peerHost(remoteAddr string) string {
+	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		host = remoteAddr
+	}
+	return host
+}
+
+// ClientIP 兼容旧签名:未配置可信代理时退化为"仅信任内网对端"。
+// 保留给直接调用方;HTTP 处理路径统一走 LoginLimiter.ClientIP。
+func ClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
+	return NewLoginLimiter(nil, 0, 0, nil).ClientIP(r)
 }
 
 // Allow reports whether a login attempt from ip may proceed.
@@ -85,20 +128,3 @@ redis.call('ZADD', key, now, ARGV[4])
 redis.call('EXPIRE', key, ARGV[5])
 return {0, count + 1}
 `)
-
-// ClientIP extracts the caller's IP for login rate limiting. X-Forwarded-For
-// is trusted here because nginx is the only ingress and overwrites the header
-// on every proxy hop; the first value is the client address. Falls back to
-// RemoteAddr for direct connections.
-func ClientIP(r *http.Request) string {
-	if fwd := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); fwd != "" {
-		if first := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(fwd, ",")[0]); first != "" {
-			return first
-		}
-	}
-	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
-	if err != nil {
-		host = r.RemoteAddr
-	}
-	return host
-}