0.10.1: 安全与业务逻辑加固、新品牌与部署加固

三轮审查修复(60+ 项),相对远端 main(b536672)的关键变更:
- 安全: 数据面 SSRF 拨号防护(防 DNS rebinding)/上游凭据剥离/登录防枚举
  与锁定态统一/可信代理(X-Forwarded-For)限流加固/会话版本失效机制/
  撤销即时传播/弱密钥拒绝启动/脱敏字节级重写(保签名契约)
- 业务逻辑: 裸 body 上传 panic/bootstrap 审计管线卡死/定价通配符优先级/
  全局工具可见性/调度器停机补跑/TOTP 挑战令牌消费顺序/熔断探针语义/
  >4MB 响应 token 计量/管理员重置密码作废会话 等
- 前端: 新 logo(语枢 AI 网关主题)/Provider 凭据异常警示/删除入口/
  后端错误消息透传/localStorage 敏感数据收敛
- 部署: CREDENTIAL_MASTER_KEY 持久化与弱值拒绝/Provider DELETE 接口/
  nginx 安全头/worker 内存限制
- 新增迁移 000029(key_hash 索引)/000030(usage_daily 币种维度)

internal/identity/ratelimit_test.go

@@ -3,21 +3,34 @@ package identity
 import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/netip"
 	"testing"
 )
 
 func TestClientIP(t *testing.T) {
+	// 可信代理:环回 + RFC1918(docker-compose nginx 同网段场景)。
+	trusted := []netip.Prefix{
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.0/8"),
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12"),
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
+	}
+	limiter := NewLoginLimiter(nil, 0, 0, trusted)
+
 	cases := []struct {
 		name       string
 		remoteAddr string
 		xfwd       string
 		want       string
 	}{
-		{"xfwd first value", "10.0.0.1:52341", "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.2", "203.0.113.9"},
-		{"xfwd single", "10.0.0.1:52341", "198.51.100.7", "198.51.100.7"},
-		{"xfwd with spaces", "10.0.0.1:52341", " 192.0.2.5 ", "192.0.2.5"},
+		{"xfwd first value from trusted proxy", "10.0.0.1:52341", "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.2", "203.0.113.9"},
+		{"xfwd single from trusted proxy", "10.0.0.1:52341", "198.51.100.7", "198.51.100.7"},
+		{"xfwd with spaces from trusted proxy", "10.0.0.1:52341", " 192.0.2.5 ", "192.0.2.5"},
+		{"xfwd ignored from untrusted public peer", "203.0.113.9:8080", "198.51.100.7", "203.0.113.9"},
+		{"xfwd ignored from CGNAT peer outside trust", "100.64.0.5:8080", "198.51.100.7", "100.64.0.5"},
 		{"no xfwd falls back to remote", "203.0.113.9:8080", "", "203.0.113.9"},
 		{"no xfwd and no port", "[2001:db8::1]:443", "", "2001:db8::1"},
+		{"trusted peer without xfwd uses peer", "172.20.0.2:8080", "", "172.20.0.2"},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range cases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -26,9 +39,20 @@ func TestClientIP(t *testing.T) {
 			if tc.xfwd != "" {
 				req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tc.xfwd)
 			}
-			if got := ClientIP(req); got != tc.want {
+			if got := limiter.ClientIP(req); got != tc.want {
 				t.Fatalf("ClientIP() = %q, want %q", got, tc.want)
 			}
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestClientIPNoTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
+	// 未配置可信代理时(如网关端口直接暴露):任何对端的 XFF 都被忽略。
+	limiter := NewLoginLimiter(nil, 0, 0, nil)
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", nil)
+	req.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:8080"
+	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "198.51.100.7")
+	if got := limiter.ClientIP(req); got != "203.0.113.9" {
+		t.Fatalf("ClientIP() = %q, want %q", got, "203.0.113.9")
+	}
+}